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Bishop further defends this fideistic view in concluding chapters by 
arguing that commitment to faith ventures understood in this way is jus-
tified as long as one goes beyond, but not contrary to, the evidence. We 
are still responsible for looking at whatever evidence is available, and for 
holding consistent and coherent beliefs. His view therefore is a robust 
fideism that places genuinely objective conditions on morally permissible 
faith-ventures; yet this shows only that fideism is undefeated, not that it is 
established. Therefore the debate with hard line evidentialist approaches 
(which insist that we should withhold assent to religious beliefs) ends in 
an impasse, in the sense that neither evidentialism nor fideism is estab-
lished. Bishop also warns correctly against the temptation to adopt a hard 
line evidentialist view because one is antecedently committed to natural-
ism, in which case one is in the same boat as the fideist. His final word is 
that the impasse may have to be solved politically, and vaguely suggests 
that some Rawlsian view might be the right way to do this (p. 213). This is 
a disappointing conclusion, given that the Rawlsian approach is generally 
inhospitable to religion, and that it would require us to decide in advance 
of the debate between religion and secularism what can count as properly 
belonging in the debate.
The implications of Bishop’s fideistic view are a moral pluralism, thus 
a rejection of religious exclusivism; also rejection of any view that holds 
that the question of theistic faith beliefs must be settled before we can es-
tablish a theory of “correct morality”; it also might entail the rejection of 
all classical views of God on the grounds that correct morality could rule 
out the traditional God on the basis of the existence of evil. In general, our 
(individual?) accounts of “correct morality” will define what can count as 
acceptable religious beliefs on this view. Although Bishop’s argument is 
sophisticated, complex and carefully developed, it faces some clear diffi-
culties, especially concerning whether one should commit to a belief with-
out adequate evidence, about relativism, and about whether we should 
accept the evidential ambiguity of theism in our personal beliefs (as dis-
tinct from settling the matter in our own minds, while recognizing that, 
as on many subjects, others may come to a different conclusion). Despite 
these misgivings, his attempt to defend a modest, but robust, fideism is 
one of the most interesting in recent times.
God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Argu-
ments, by Yujin Nagasawa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Pp. 162. $85.00 (Cloth).
T. J. MAWSON, University of Oxford
This is a very well-written and clear book, one which brings together ‘knowl-
edge arguments’ from the fields of the philosophy of mind and the philoso-
phy of religion for instructive ‘parallel processing’ and fruitful interplay.
It is divided into four parts. In part one, Nagasawa considers the concep-
tual background to knowledge arguments: “Knowledge arguments attempt 
to transform, via alchemical processes, the base metal of epistemological pre-
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misses into the gold of ontological conclusions. From what one knows and 
does not know, they attempt to derive what there is and is not in this world” 
(p. 3). Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Argument and Jackson’s Mary Ar-
gument are the two knowledge arguments from the philosophy of mind on 
which Nagasawa focuses. The two knowledge arguments from the philoso-
phy of religion which occupy him are Grim’s argument from knowledge de 
se against the logical coherence of the classical theistic concept of God and an 
argument going in the same direction found in several authors and proceed-
ing from some putative necessary conditions for concept possession.
According to Nagasawa, one important marker to place on the map in 
drawing out the similarities of these arguments is what he calls the ‘Physi-
cal omniscience thesis,’ that ‘Physical omniscience is omniscience simplic-
iter’ at least with respect to the universe (p. 8). In essence, if physicalism 
about the universe were true, the Physical Omniscience thesis would need 
to be true; if everything in the universe were physical, then in knowing 
everything about all that is physical, one would ipso facto know everything 
about everything in the universe. When we talk of the universe here, we 
should note then that we are ignoring abstract objects, God, any angels 
or other supernatural beings that there might be, and so on. In this sense 
then, physicalism is compatible with theism (Peter van Inwagen is a phys-
icalist) and is, Nagasawa urges, a theory we have good reason to favour. 
Nagel’s Bat Argument and Jackson’s Mary Argument can then be seen—
and indeed are, or at least were (Jackson has changed his mind), seen—as 
arguments against physicalism, arguments which start from the Physi-
cal Omniscience thesis and which, being against physicalism, we have 
good reason—Nagasawa urges—to hope are flawed. Nagel’s argument is, 
roughly, that given that there is something about what it is like to be a bat 
which we cannot know, while there is nothing physical about a bat which 
we cannot know, so physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter; 
and, as we’ve seen, it would be were physicalism true, so physicalism is 
false. Jackson’s argument is, roughly, that given that prior to leaving her 
black and white room Mary knows everything that there is to know about 
the physical properties of colour, but does not know what it is like to see, 
for example, a red patch, so physical omniscience is not omniscience sim-
pliciter; and, as we’ve seen, it would be were physicalism true, so physi-
calism is false. But according to Nagasawa these arguments should not 
convince. Our reasonable hope that there is a flaw in them is vindicated.
According to Nagasawa, for physical omniscience it is not enough to 
know only those theoretically communicable physical propositions (those 
which humans like Nagel can know about bats while yet remaining humans 
and which Mary can know about redness prior to leaving her room). In ad-
dition, we must also have and use certain “epistemic powers to intuit other 
true physical propositions that are not covered by complete theories of the 
physical sciences” (p. 13). So, in essence, Nagel, even if he swots up all that 
a human can about bats from books, would not be physically omniscient 
about bats (because qua human he would not have the epistemic powers of 
bats [one presumes]); and Mary is not physically omniscient about redness 
prior to leaving her room (she has the epistemic power [one presumes] to 
be so, but she has not yet been able to exercise this power). So, just as Nagel 
is not able to intuit propositions such as ‘This is what it is like to be a bat,’ 
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Mary has not yet intuited ‘relevant propositions’ (p. 13) such as ‘This is 
what it is like to see red.’ They are not, after all, physically omniscient.
In part two, Nagasawa turns to consider what he argues are parallel 
arguments from the philosophy of religion and tells us a bit more about 
the crucial notion of epistemic powers. “It is often said that knowledge is 
power. If this cliché means that knowledge is equivalent to power, then it 
is [wrong]. . . . However, if it means that knowledge is a special form, an 
instantiated form, of specific powers, then it [is right]” (p. 23). Grim’s ar-
gument that God cannot know what I know when I know that, for exam-
ple, I am making a mess is undercut—Nagasawa argues—if we suppose 
that God may have the epistemic power to know this. But if we decline to 
suppose that God may have this power, it should be because we think that 
it is strongly impossible that anyone other than I know what I know when 
I know that I am making a mess, in which case a demand that God be able 
to know this would be a demand that God have a power it is strongly 
impossible for Him to have (p. 25), which is—obviously—an unreason-
able demand on omnipotence (it is a ‘pseudo task,’ as Nagasawa puts it). 
The argument against God’s existence from concept possession on which 
Nagasawa focuses is roughly this: to know what, e.g., fear is, one has to 
experience it; God by definition needs to know what fear is and God by 
definition cannot experience it. So God cannot exist. This argument fares 
badly too, according to Nagasawa. It rests on a “version of concept empiri-
cism [which] is subject to . . . counterexamples” (p. 43). For example, Vic-
toria might have experienced fear and thus have the concept and then an 
exact duplicate of her, Elizabeth, be made; it does not seem that we should 
say that Victoria understands the concept and yet Elizabeth does not, as 
they would be neurologically (and in every other respect) identical (p. 60). 
Why not then just say that “God could comprehend a proposition that 
tells what fear is intuitively . . . God can just intuit what fear is accurately 
without possessing or exercising an ability to fear” (p. 71)?
In part three, Nagasawa argues that his analyses of these arguments 
from the philosophy of religion are also applicable to the knowledge argu-
ments in the philosophy of mind; the bat argument is structurally parallel 
to the argument from knowledge de se, and the Mary argument to the 
argument from concept possession (p. 77). “Nagel requires physicalism to 
place him in a position to perform a pseudo task, namely, being a bat-type 
creature while simultaneously being a non-bat-type creature” (p. 87). This 
is because one must either say that a human could in principle know what 
it is like to be a bat while staying a human (just as God could in principle 
have the epistemic power to know what I know when I know that I am 
making a mess), but in fact Nagel would presumably not be willing to 
concede this, or then one must say that a human could not do this; he/
she would have to become a batman or maybe even a bat first (whilst also 
remaining a human), but then this is obviously strongly impossible. “I 
have maintained that there is a fundamental problem with this argument, 
which is that he tries to derive an apparent difficulty for physicalism by 
appealing to a necessary impossibility” (p. 98).
Finally, in part four, ‘non-theoretical physicalism’ is advanced as the 
version of physicalism that is immune to the concerns raised by these 
knowledge arguments.
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It “commits to the standard physicalist claim that everything in this 
world, including trees, computers, stones, neutrons, and even our con-
scious experiences, are, in the relevant sense, all physical” (p. 135). It ac-
cepts, along with the arguments that Nagasawa has by now shown we 
have good reason to reject, the good premise: physical omniscience is om-
niscience simpliciter. However, it maintains—thus blocking these knowl-
edge arguments against it—that “theoretically communicable physical 
omniscience is not physical omniscience” (p. 136). So, “omniscience sim-
pliciter requires an instantiation of extraordinary epistemic powers to in-
tuit relevant propositions” (p. 136). Nagel’s situation (assuming he can’t 
turn himself into a bat) and Mary’s situation before she leaves the room 
are ones of (potentially [assuming he hasn’t swotted up on an encyclopae-
dia of bat theory] in the case of Nagel and actually in the case of Mary) 
being theoretically physically omniscient, but not omniscient simpliciter. 
Non-theoretical physicalism is still a theory—a physicalist theory in-
deed—then, but it “does not attempt to define physicalism in terms of the-
oretically communicable propositions” (p. 139). As Nagasawa points out, 
“Physicalism in general is committed to the ontological thesis that every-
thing in this world is, in the relevant sense, physical and, consequently, 
the physical omniscience thesis that physical omniscience is omniscience 
simpliciter. Physicalism is not, however, committed, by itself, even implic-
itly, to the theoretically communicable omniscience thesis” (p. 141). So 
non-theoretical physicalism—which denies the theoretically communi-
cable omniscience thesis—is, by the failures diagnosed in the arguments 
looked at in the course of Nagasawa’s book, the sort of physicalism which 
should be preferred.
Of course one might tug at some of these strands—definitions of physi-
calism, epistemic powers, theoretical communicability—and see what un-
ravelled, but all in all God and Phenomenal Consciousness is a closely-argued 
work that maps an underexplored area of shared borderland between the 
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion and, as such, it will be 
of interest to philosophers working in either field and of especial interest 
to those working in both.
Toward a Theory of Human Rights, by Michael J. Perry. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2007. 253 pages. Cloth $70.00.
ROBERT T. MILLER, Villanova University School of Law
In this short book Michael J. Perry addresses three issues. First, he sets out 
what he calls the morality of human rights and argues that, although it 
is clear that religious theories can support such a morality, it is far from 
clear that non-religious theories can do so. Second, he asks which laws 
people who affirm the morality of human rights should press their gov-
ernment to adopt, especially in relation to capital punishment, abortion, 
and same-sex unions. Third, he inquires into the proper role of courts in 
protecting human rights entrenched in a nation’s constitutional law. This 
is a lot to do in 142 pages of text (the rest of the book is endnotes), and I 
